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International Legal Frameworks Relating to China's
Nuclear Exports to Iran: Safeguarding the Transfer
of Dual-Use Nuclear Technology
Jon L. Woodard*
I. Introduction
During the early 1990s, the United States and Russia began to
reduce their nuclear arsenals, ending the intense arms race that had
persisted during the previous decades. While it appeared that the
threat of a nuclear confrontation between the superpowers was
ending, it also appeared that smaller, less stable, and highly
aggressive states would soon have the technology and
infrastructure to develop nuclear arsenals of their own.' Given the
political tension that has existed between the United States and
Iran since the late 1970s, the realization that Iran would likely be
included in this collection of emerging nuclear powers was
particularly troubling. Currently, the U.S. government believes
that Iran is actively engaged in a clandestine nuclear weapons
program U.S. and Israeli intelligence estimates suggest that Iran
could develop full nuclear weapon capabilities sometime between
the years 2000 and 2005.! Moreover, Iranian weapon technology
might already be at a more advanced state of development had
Iran's program not suffered setbacks such as the destruction of a
B.S., A.B., Miami University; J.D. The Dickinson School of Law of the
Pennsylvania State University. The author wishes to acknowledge Dr. John B. Woodard
for his assistance in preparing this article for publication as well as Professor William 0.
Hennessey of the Franklin Pierce Law Center for his guidance and supervision in
developing the focus of this article.
I See Barry Kellman, Bridling the International Trade of Catastrophic
Weaponry, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 755, 761 (1994).
2 See Howard Diamond, Nuclear Cooperation with China (visited Oct. 11,
1999) <http://www.armscontrol.org/FACTS/chinfact.html>.
3 See Greg J. Gerardi & Maryam Aharinejad, An Assessment of Iran's Nuclear
Facilities, 2 NONPROLIFERATION REV. (Spring-Summer 1995) <http://www.cns.miis.edu/
pubs/npr/iranuc23.htm>.
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reactor at Bushehr during an Iraqi air raid in 1987.4  Despite
setbacks, however, Iran continues to pursue its nuclear
development with foreign assistance. In 1984, China assisted Iran
in the construction of a nuclear technology center at Esfahan, and
later entered a $1.2 billion contract with Iran for the construction
of a new 300 MWe nuclear plant near Bushehr to be completed by
2005.'
The assistance that China provided to Iran for the facilities at
Esfahan and Bushehr was not an isolated event. Recognized as
one of the most aggressive arms exporters in the world, China has
a long history of exporting arms to countries throughout the
Middle East.6 For example, approximately 55% of China's
conventional weapons exports during the late 1980s went to the
Middle East.7 China also possesses an experienced and impressive
technological base for maintaining an infrastructure for the
production of nuclear warheads and delivery systems.8 In its
capacity as an exporter, the country has often drawn upon its own
technological base for providing client states with similar
comprehensive technologies, enabling those clients to eventually
develop the capability of operating and maintaining similar
technological infrastructures on their own.9
U.S. concerns over China's proliferation practices have led the
U.S. State Department to oppose Chinese nuclear exports, arguing:
"Engagement is vital to halting proliferation. It is in our vital
national interest that China embrace international norms, and
abide by them. China's record is clearly mixed. Engagement is
necessary to sustain progress made, and to address areas of
continuing concern.'"
Commentators argue that rather than reflecting any normative
set of internationally followed standards, Chinese nuclear
4 See id.
5 See id.
6 See Kellman, supra note 1, at 781.
See id. at 779-80.
8 See id. at 781.
9 See id.
10 BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, China and Non-
Proliferation: Fact Sheet (visited Oct. 11, 1999) <http:www.state.gov/www/
regions/eap/fs-china nonprolif_970617.html> [hereinafter State Dep't Fact Sheet].
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proliferation policies prior to the late 1990s were marred with
inconsistencies. 11
In January 1995, China announced that it would not sell two
nuclear reactors to Iran, possibly in response to pressures from the
U.S. government.' 2  By May 1998, national security
correspondents of the Washington Times were reporting renewed
nuclear sales discussions between Iran and China.'3 Members of
the U.S. Congress in 1996 had criticized the Chinese pledge as an
"empty promise" by a "pathological proliferator,"' 4 though the
Clinton administration insisted "there was no evidence that China
was violating its May 11 pledge not to supply illegal technology to
Pakistan or Iran."' 5
The controversy surrounding China's nuclear export policy
reflects an historic pattern in the country's nuclear dealings. Even
if international nuclear nonproliferation standards do in fact exist,
as suggested by the State Department's position, they may not
extend to exports of civil or peaceful nuclear technologies. These
standards and the legality of China's recent nuclear dealings must
be evaluated through a closer examination of current international
law. This article examines the legality of Chinese nuclear
proliferation as represented by current nuclear exports to Iran.
Part II discusses the problem of the inherent military/nonmilitary
duality of nuclear technology. Part III provides an overview of the
existing international legal regimes as they apply to nuclear energy
exports and will examine whether an applicable international
standard exists. Part IV explores the limits of the regime
examined in Part III. Part VI analyzes possible U.S. actions that
" See Gary J. Meise, Securing the Strength of the Renewed NPT: China, the
Linchpin "Middle Kingdom," 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 539, 539 (1997).
12 See China Says Deals to Sell Iran Nuclear Reactors Scrapped (visited Oct. 11,
1995) <http://www.sddt.com/files/librarywire/96wireheadlines/01_96/DN96_01_09/
DN96_01 09_lc.htm> [hereinafter China Says Deals... Scrapped].
13 See CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY, Decision Brief: 'See No Evil': China's
Proliferation Continues Apace; Clinton Dissembles/Ignores This Reality, Seeks to
Reward the PRC (visited Oct. 11, 1999) <http://www. security-
policy.org/papers/1998/98-D 115.html>.
14 R. Jeffrey Smith & Thomas W. Lippman, Beijing Vows to End Nuclear Sales;
Aid To Russia Continued, WASH. POST, May 11, 1996, at Al.
'5 Peter Slevin, U.S., China Advance on Nuclear Trade, Bicker Over Rights,
SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 21, 1996, at A13 (emphasis added).
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may ultimately achieve the desired result of Chinese
nonproliferation to Iran. Finally, Part VII considers the prospects
for realistic changes in both Chinese and U.S. foreign nuclear
policies. This review begins with an overview of the inherent
problems associated with classifying various areas of nuclear
technology.
H. Problems of Military and Nonmilitary Duality of Nuclear
Technology
The international nature of the nuclear processing cycle has
complicated the formation of a uniform nuclear legal vocabulary.
No single meaning of "peaceful uses" has been generally accepted
by the international community, 6 due to the recent overlapping of
traditional peaceful and nonpeaceful areas of nuclear technology. 7
For example, military uses of nuclear technology not related to the
production of weaponry may be considered peaceful.'8 Nuclear
detonations for large-scale construction or strictly scientific
evaluations, however, may not qualify as peaceful applications.'9
In addition, nuclear facilities built to generate electricity may also
produce by-products that can serve as weapon fuels. The same
problem extends to the area of nuclear know-how, since the
knowledge needed for implementing most peaceful uses of nuclear
energy is often indistinguishable from that needed for the
production of weapons.2°
For these reasons, the international community often regards
peaceful nuclear energy exports as being equivalent to weapons
proliferation.2' China, citing other internationally recognized
obligations, has often criticized other nuclear weapon states for
denying peaceful nuclear technology to developing countries.22
16 Krateros Ioannou, Nuclear Energy, Peaceful Uses, in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB.
INT'L LAW 290, 290 (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1986).
17 See Meise, supra note 11, at 552-53.
18 See Ioannou, supra note 16, at 290.
19 See id.
20 See MOHAMED ELBARADEI ET AL., International Law and Nuclear Energy:
Overview of the Legal Framework (visited Oct. 11, 1999)
<http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/inforesource/bulletin/bu1373/rames.html>.
21 See id.
22 See Jill M. Sheldon, Nuclear Weapons and the Laws of War: Does Customary
International Law Prohibit the Use of Nuclear Weapons in all Circumstances?, 20
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Consequently, China's export policy is often directly at odds with
those of the United States and other nuclear weapon states.
Despite the inherent ambiguities of nuclear technology, the
international legal regime regulating peaceful uses of nuclear
energy is interwoven with the legal regime of nuclear weapons
nonproliferation. 23  Thus, many sources of international nuclear
law may extend to both military and civilian applications. A
number of potential sources may be suitable for this examination.
Further, combinations of these sources may lead to binding
international standards.
III. Overview of the International Nuclear Legal Regime
The breadth of the nuclear energy field and the inherent
military/nonmilitary duality of nuclear and nuclear-related
technologies would significantly limit any effort to codify an all-
encompassing international nuclear legal regime, let alone an
effort to codify an international regime relating to weapons of
mass destruction.14 In comparison, international caselaw has been
similarly limited because (1) nuclear weapons have not been used
in combat since the end of World War II, so no claims have been
brought before international tribunals; (2) on the rare occasions
that international tribunals have commented on nuclear weapons
use, they have provided no per se rule to outlaw their use;25 and (3)
where commentators have argued that closely related areas of law,
such as internationally-recognized humanitarian rules of war,
seemingly outlaw nuclear weapons, they have conceded that such
prohibitions are not per se prohibitions. 26  For these reasons,
existing international frameworks have grown from a web of
national and international measures into a mix of legally binding
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 181, 192-93 (1996). China makes this contention on the basis of
the obligations of nuclear weapons States, under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to
share their technology with nonweapons State members of the treaty. See infra notes 50-
58 and accompanying text.
23 See Ioannou, supra note 16, at 293.
24 See Kellman, supra note 1, at 800.
25 In an opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons, the International Court of
Justice held unanimously that while the use or threat of nuclear weapons was not
explicitly authorized by international law, no customary rule or convention specifically
prohibited their use or threat of use. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, 35 I.L.M. 809, 827-31 (July 8, 1996).
26 See Sheldon, supra note 22, at 254.
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standards and regulations.27
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 8 or
Non-Proliferation Treaty [hereinafter NPT] is considered the most
important and viable multilateral attempt to date for controlling
the spread of nuclear weapons.2 ' The treaty's primary purpose is
to prevent horizontal proliferation of nuclear material, inhibiting
the transfer of nuclear weapons or weapons-related technology
from nuclear weapon states to non-nuclear weapon states.3°
Pursuant to the treaty, nuclear weapon-possessing states may not
provide nuclear weapons to or encourage weapon development by
non-nuclear weapon states.3' States without nuclear arms agree
not to acquire such weapons,32 with the understanding that all
states may freely develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy.33 For
the purposes of verification and treaty compliance, each non-
nuclear weapon state agrees to accept safeguards as established
through subsequent negotiations with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA).34 Such negotiations with the IAEA must
commence immediately upon accession or ratification of the NPT
by a given state3 and embody the detailed implementation and
technical details to be followed in complying with the Article III
safeguards requirements of the NPT.36 Every party to the treaty
must also refrain from providing (a) source or special fissionable
materials, suitable for the production of nuclear weapons; or (b)
equipment or materials for preparing or processing fissionable
materials to any non-nuclear state, unless the materials are subject
to the treaty's safeguards.37 Nothing may impede member states
27 See ELBARADEI, supra note 20.
28 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature
July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT].
29 See Ioannou, supra note 16, at 282-83.
30 See ELBARADEI, supra note 20.
31 See NPT, supra note 28, art I.
32 See id. art. II.
33 See id. art. IV.
34 See id. art. HI.
35 See id. art. I1. This immediate negotiation requirement applies only to parties
acceding to the NPT after the date of ratification. See id.
36 See ELBARADEI, supra note 20.
37 See NPT, supra note 28, art. HI.
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from developing peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and all parties
have the explicit right to partake in peaceful nuclear
development.38 All parties also have the explicit obligation to
make potential benefits of nuclear energy available to non-nuclear
weapon states at the lowest cost possible. 9 In accordance with this
requirement, safeguards implemented by the IAEA must be
undertaken so as not to hamper economic or technological
development of the non-nuclear weapon states.40 Additionally, all
member states are obligated to make good faith efforts toward the
cessation of the nuclear arms race and international disarmament.'
With over 180 adherents,42 the NPT is by far the most
comprehensive and effective multilateral agreement in existence.
It is also one of the most respected, with no party having ever
withdrawn from the treaty and with only two recorded breaches
during its first 25 years. 3 In 1995, parties to the NPT approved
the treaty's indefinite renewal." China, Iran, and the United States
all maintain NPT memberships, with China joining most recently
in 1992.45
As an instrument of international law, the NPT relies heavily
on the IAEA, since the IAEA implements the NPT's safeguards
mechanism. Among potential sources of international law, the
only multilateral treaty dealing exclusively with peaceful nuclear
energy uses is the Statute of the International Atomic Energy
Agency46 (IAEA Statute). The IAEA itself is the central
international authority for channeling procedures for peaceful uses
38 See id. art. IV.
39 See id. art. V.
40 See id. art. III.
41 See id. art. VI.
42 See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (Oct. 11,
1999) <http://www.iaea .org/worldatom/glance/legal/npt.html> (containing an updated
IAEA listing of current parties to the NPT) [hereinafter NPT List].
43 See Kellman, supra note 1, at 801. The only recorded violations during the 25-
year life of the treaty have been those committed by Iraq and North Korea. See id.
44 See Meise, supra note 11, at 541.
45 See NPT List, supra note 42.
46 See Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, July 29, 1957, 8
U.S.T. 1093, 276 U.N.T.S. 3 (as amended on Oct. 4, 1961, 14 U.S.T. 135, 471 U.N.T.S.
334) available in (visited Oct. 11, 1999)
<http//www.iaea.org/worldatomglance/profile/statute.html> [hereinafter IAEA Statute].
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of nuclear power.17 As an international organization, however, the
IAEA's role is limited by its governing treaty.48 Pursuant to the
treaty, the IAEA must establish and administer a system of
safeguards to ensure that special fissionable or other materials
under its control are not used for military purposes.49  In
performing these safeguards, the agency may send inspectors into
a nonweapon state's sovereign territory. ° The inspectors must
have access at all times to all facilities, materials, and equipment
which must be safeguarded under the statute in order to determine
compliance and whether any of the inspected materials have been
used for any military purpose.5 The statute also grants the agency
the right to require the maintenance and production of operating
records for ensuring accountability of fissionable materials. 2
In addition to setting forth the agency's duties for conducting
NPT safeguards, the IAEA Statute also requires the agency to
undertake certain affirmative steps toward promoting peaceful
uses of nuclear energy among states. The general requirement is
for the agency to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic
energy for peaceful uses and exclude military-related uses.53 In
doing this, the IAEA must make provision for materials, services,
equipment, and facilities to meet the needs of underdeveloped
states.5 4  The agency must also work to foster exchanges of
scientific and technical information on peaceful nuclear energy
uses.55 Any member state requesting agency assistance in setting
up a peaceful atomic energy project is entitled to receive
assistance with respect to fissionable and related materials,
services, equipment, and facilities.56 The statute requires the
agency to prevent facilities and equipment under its control from
41 See Ioannou, supra note 16, at 290.
48 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 223 (1986).
49 See IAEA Statute, supra note 46, art. Ill(A)(5).
" See id. art. XI(A)(6).
51 See id.
52 See id. art. XII(A)(3)-(4).
13 See id. arts. 1-Ill.
54 See id. art. Ill(A)(2).
11 See id. art. IlI(A)(3).
56 See id. art. XI(A).
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being used for military purposes." In theory, upon discovering
that a receiving state has engaged in a military purpose or
otherwise failed to comply with the NPT safeguard requirements,
the agency may withdraw materials made in furtherance of a
project and terminate or suspend agency assistance. 8 The receipt
of future technical assistance can thereafter be conditioned on
whether the requesting state previously adhered to the NPT's
safeguard requirements or other NPT regulations. 9 The agency
must also report instances of noncompliance to the General
Assembly and Security Council of the United Nations.6 °
Depending on the circumstances and the specific response,
subsequent Security Council Resolutions can significantly expand
the IAEA's verification rights.6'
In past decades, the NPT, the IAEA Statute, and associated
frameworks have each played major roles in forming an
international nuclear legal regime. In recent years, however,
commentators have observed that each of these instruments has
shifted in its purpose.6' The ultimate goal of international
nonproliferation policy has been to provide security and to
maintain hegemony among states.63  Since the end of the Cold
War, the focus of instruments like the NPT has shifted away from
the threat of a superpower confrontation to the danger of renegade
third world countries developing and exploiting nuclear weapon
technology. 64 Though imperfect, the NPT and other existing
nuclear frameworks were successful in slowing weapons
17 See id. art. III(A)(5).
58 See id. art. X(A)(7).
'9 See ELBARADEI, supra note 20.
60 IAEA Statute, supra note 46, art. XII(C). Notably, in the instances of the two
known NPT violations by Iraq and North Korea, the IAEA subsequently reported its
findings of non-compliance to the United Nations, which eventually led to U.N. Security
Council Resolutions. See ELBARADE!, supra note 20.
61 In the case of Iraq's noncompliance, for example, the Security Council's
Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991 extended the IAEA's rights in this way. The Resolution
involved a special plan for on-going monitoring by the Agency and continued Security
Council sanctioning for the IAEA inspectors. See ELBARADEI, supra note 20.
62 See Meise, supra note 11, at 542-43.
63 See Kellman, supra note 1, at 767.
I See Meise, supra note 11, at 542-43.
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proliferation during the Cold War and in subsequent years.65 As a
result, the world is considerably safer than it would have been
absent such frameworks.66  The question remains, however,
whether existing frameworks are suitable for preventing
proliferation in the post-Cold War era. A review of the
frameworks' potential shortcomings is needed to address this
question.
IV. Limitations of the Existing Nuclear Law Regimes
In spite of its past success, the existing international legal
framework is limited by the same fundamental aspects that made
the framework successful in controlling nuclear proliferation
during the Cold War. For example, the NPT, in attempting to
delineate between peaceful and nonpeaceful uses of nuclear
energy, places no restriction on trade that promotes peaceful
nuclear energy uses.67 Exporters providing dual-use nuclear
materials need only demonstrate that their exporting activities are
not intended to further weapons activities. 6' The NPT places no
further restriction on the trade of such equipment, even though
such equipment could be used to develop a weapons program.69
This inherent shortcoming of the existing framework has been
recognized as the most significant limitation in preventing
horizontal proliferation among states. 70 In particular, the IAEA
has never acknowledged the impropriety of any of China's well-
documented activities in the proliferation of such dual-use
materials."
By design, Article III safeguards required under the NPT have
additional limitations that depend upon whether an activity has
been declared to the appropriate international authorities.72 As
implemented by the IAEA, the existing system of safeguards has
65 See Kellman, supra note 1, at 800.
66 See id.
67 See Kellman, supra note 1, at 805-06.
68 See id. at 806.
69 See id.
70 See Meise, supra note 11, at 553.
71 See id. at 565.
72 See IAEA Statute, supra note 46, art. HI; see also Kellman, supra note 1, at
802-03.
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been highly effective for regulating declared activities, but much
less effective for regulating activities undeclared by the acting
parties.73  While declared activities automatically invoke
supervision by the IAEA or other appropriate authorities, the
existing framework, including the NPT, provides no formal or
systematic mechanism to inform the IAEA of clandestine
activities.74  These limitations have led to five notable
shortcomings in the regime's safeguards mechanism: (1) the
safeguards mechanism ultimately relies on information provided
by either the exporting or receiving state involved in a given
nuclear transaction; (2) after the given transaction, the safeguards
mechanism alone cannot prevent a state from transferring material
from peaceful to military purposes;75 (3) safeguards alone cannot
be used to anticipate a state's future actions with respect to
compliance; (4) safeguards may be useless as a verification
mechanism after materials have been transferred out of a given
state to another jurisdiction; and (5) the safeguards mechanism is
terminated once materials are no longer usable or practically
useful for nuclear purposes, limiting retroactive implementation of
the mechanism.76  Commentators have blamed the recent
developmental successes by the Iraqi and North Korean weapons
programs on these listed shortcomings.77
In addition to the regime's inherent shortcomings, enforcement
actions undertaken by the international community also appear to
have a limited effect. The NPT provides no explicit penalty for
noncompliance." The IAEA does provide some enforcement
actions, such as: (1) the ability to condition the receipt of future
technical assistance on past NPT compliance;7 9 and (2) the ability
to suspend members from the rights and privileges of NPT/IAEA
membership with a two-thirds vote of the IAEA General
73 See ELBARADEI, supra note 20.
74 See Kellman, supra note 1, at 805.
71 It is still possible, however, that such a transfer may invoke action by the UN
Security Counsel. See ELBARADEI, supra note 20.
76 See id.
77 See Kellman, supra note 1, at 804-05.
78 See id. at 805.
71 See IAEA Statute, supra note 46, art. XII(A)(7).
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Conference. °  The actual effectiveness of these measures,
however, is limited by, among other factors, (1) whether the
noncomplying state is actively participating in the NPT/IAEA and
IAEA General Conference; 8' (2) whether the noncomplying state is
currently receiving a substantial level of assistance from the
IAEA;82 and (3) whether the noncomplying state has future
prospects for receiving IAEA assistance.
The most effective methods of enforcing standards, whether
set forth by customary law, the NPT, the IAEA, or associated
frameworks, are unclear and not pre-established. 4  It has been
suggested that the only all-encompassing IAEA enforcement
mechanism is the IAEA's obligation for reporting violations to the
U.N. Security Council.85 Given the fact that the Security Council
does not generally undertake to enforce treaties, however, actual
Security Council response is normally limited to noncompliance in
situations that appear imminently to threaten international peace
and security.86  Instead, enforcement action is most often
undertaken by political leaders on an ad hoc basis, depending on
the actual or perceived threat to international peace. 87  Further,
there appears to be little penalty, if any, for a state's failure to
comply with a NPT resolution.
Regardless of the mechanisms within the existing international
framework, the most significant limitation may be the
framework's ultimate respect for state sovereignty-a factor that
80 See id. art. V(A)-(D).
81 See ELBARADEI, supra note 20; see also IAEA Statute, supra note 46, art.
IV(C) (providing guidance as to the terms and conditions of membership).
82 See ELBARADEI, supra note 20; see also IAEA Statute, supra note 46, arts.
XII(A)(7), Il1(A) (outlining the safeguards and procedures to terminating membership
and discussing the functions of the IAEA, respectively).
83 See ELBARADEI, supra note 20; see also IAEA Statute, supra note 46, art.
IV(C) (outlining the terms and conditions of membership).
84 See Kellman, supra note 1, at 767.
85 See id. at 805.
86 See id.
87 See id. at 767. In this respect, it is difficult to distinguish the ad hoc response
of political leaders in the international community from that of the U.N. Security Council
unless the imminent threats, as actually perceived, differ. See id.
88 See Meise, supra note 11. A State's failure to work toward worldwide
disarmament is an example of non-compliance. See NPT, supra note 28, art. VI.
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during the Cold War worked to strengthen the regime.89 For
example, under the NPT, parties have the right to exercise their
respective state sovereignty and withdraw from the treaty after
three months prior notice.90  The NPT expressly allows for
withdrawal upon a state's individual determination that the treaty
has in some way jeopardized the supreme interests of that state.
91
Withdrawal effectively terminates the safeguards mechanism as
implemented by the IAEA in the respective country.92 Even before
a state withdraws, the IAEA is required to conduct all activities,
including the implementation of safeguards, with the maximum
respect for the state's sovereign rights.93 Critics have argued that
the three-month withdrawal mechanism actually encourages
proliferation because states withdrawing would most likely be
those on the verge of nuclear development.94 If this is true, then
the IAEA Statute actually works against the objective of
nonproliferation.
By requiring and facilitating exchanges of fissionable
96
materials, 95 technical information, and training of scientists, 97 the
IAEA Statute allows for nuclear transfers that could enable a
nonweapon state, through the accumulation of dual-use nuclear
technologies, to build a nuclear infrastructure near the threshold of
nuclear weapons capability. The state's subsequent withdrawal
from the NPT could easily precede the initialization of a fully
functional weapons program. Although the existing international
regime has been a qualified success in restricting access to nuclear
technology, only non-NPT states such as Israel, South Africa, and
Pakistan have been denied technology under the regime.98 Such
restrictions clearly do not apply to full NPT members such as
89 See Meise, supra note 11, at 571, 576.
90 NPT, supra note 28, art. X(1).
91 See id.
92 See ELBARADEI, supra note 20.
93 See IAEA Statute, supra note 46, art. 111(D).
94 See Meise, supra note 11, at 552.
95 See IAEA Statute, supra note 46, art. IX(D).
96 See id. art VIII.
97 See id. art. III(A)(4).
98 See Kellman, supra note 1, at 808.
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China and Iran.99 So long as China successfully qualified its
nuclear transfers to Iran as peaceful, there appears to be very little
to preclude the legality of those transfers under the current
international framework. For this reason, the United States must
examine all options within the letter and spirit of the existing
international framework if it hopes to limit China's nuclear
exports to another NPT state.
V. Potential Courses of Action for Influencing Chinese
Proliferation
China's rights under the NPT have not prevented the United
States from asserting at least a nominal influence over China's
nuclear dealings.'0°  As described in Part I, China's 1995
announcement that it would cease construction of two nuclear
reactors in Iran was an apparent response to heightened pressures
from the U.S. government.' °' Critics of U.S. foreign policy have
alleged that the greatest limitation on U.S. efforts to curtail
Chinese nuclear proliferation has not been China's resistance, but
rather the historic lack of consistent foreign policy exercised by
recent U.S. administrations. 10 2 Still, ad hoc government policies
have proven effective in many directly and indirectly related
circumstances. After a conclusive finding in 1991 that China had
sold components to Pakistan for its M- 11 missile delivery system,
President Clinton responded with a restriction on computer
technology exports to China-a restriction that proved a heavy
detriment to China's satellite program.' °  China eventually
accepted the guidelines of the International Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) in return for an American promise to lift
the embargo.'0 Some observers believe that China's acceptance of
the MTCR guidelines was in fact a quid pro quo with the United
States.' °5  Future assurances of technology transfer may have
99 See id.
1oo See Meise, supra note 11, at 569-70.
101 See China Says Deals ... Scrapped, supra note 12.
102 See Meise, supra note 11, at 564.
103 See id. at 557-58.
104 See Kellman, supra note 1, at 785. The MTCR is a major part of the
international control regime relating to missile delivery systems. See id.
105 See Meise, supra note 11, at 569-70.
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played a role in the 1995 suspension of reactor shipments to
Iran. 0 6 Indeed, during the 1990s, Congressional limitations on
exports of technology, whether or not related specifically to
nuclear weapon know-how, have proven to be an effective
bargaining tool for curtailing Chinese nuclear proliferation
activities. 07
Another proposed tool for restricting Chinese nuclear exports
has been economic sanctions. Congressional threats to terminate
China's most-favored-nation trading status coincided with
negotiations leading to China's MTCR adherence.' 8 The loss of
most-favored-nation status could threaten China's export market
in the United States and, therefore, played a substantial part in
China's ultimate decision to adhere. 0 9 Even so, the suggestion
that U.S. nonproliferation policy should resort to economic
sanctions against noncomplying states has been strenuously
criticized by a number of authorities, including the U.S. State
Department."0 Most opposition to economic sanctions has rested
on two observations: (1) economic sanctions merely have the
tendency to reflect the United States' short-term political concerns
and ad hoc approach to nonproliferation rather than a long-term
policy based on world-wide security, which is the greater concern
for the existing international nonproliferation regimes; and (2)
links between economic sanctions and nonproliferation most often
lead to resentment and reduced initiatives for free enterprise-two
forces that tend to work toward demilitarization."' In adopting
this sentiment, the State Department has asserted its belief that
revoking China's normal trade status would be the "wrong tool"
for stem-ming Chinese nuclear exports to Iran. ' 2 In discussing his
administration's position on China's most-favored-nation status,
President Clinton made a consistent argument that delinking
economic sanctions from China's political status would maximize




109 See Kellman, supra note 1, at 785.
"o See State Dep't Fact Sheet, supra note 10.
"'I See Meise, supra note 11, at 570.
112 See State Dep't Fact Sheet, supra note 10.
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nonproliferation."3
While the possibility of economic sanctions against China
remains a potential weapon in the arsenal of U.S. foreign policy
tactics, it is clearly not the current weapon of choice." 1
4
Regardless of which political option is chosen, commentators
have suggested two underlying objectives for any policy aimed at
restricting China's proliferation activities: (1) a decision be made
as to what messages need to be conveyed in subsequent U.S.
actions; and (2) concerns giving rise to those messages be made
blatantly clear in their conveyance." '5 For example, the Clinton
administration indicated in 1995 that it was considering
resumption of weapons testing." '6 If adopted, such a policy would
seriously undermine American credibility with respect to the
NPT."'7 Such testing would send a mixed, if not hypocritical
message to Beijing and would make for a poor argument against a
worldwide arms buildup. It could also potentially weaken
international confidence in American good faith and subsequently
lessen international resolve against China's proliferation activities.
Moreover, the potential effect of such international resolve must
not be under emphasized. International pressure has substantially
influenced Chinese foreign policy in the past and seems to have
played a major role in China's 1992 decision to adopt the NPT."8
To date, China's responses seem to rest on its government's
general concern that the existing international regime be applied
consistently and that any restrictions promulgated by the regime
be worked out through consultations among all concerned states."
9
This position reflects China's desire to affirm its sovereignty and
to assume a role as a major force in the creation and maintenance
of international policy. Consequently, negative unilateral action
by the United States would be seen as being one-sided
113 Meise, supra note 11, at 571.
114 See id.
115 See id.
116 See id. at 572.
117 See id. at 573.
118 See Kellman, supra note 1, at 785. Also illustrating the effectiveness of
external pressure is that China's NPT adoption occurred on the heels of the treaty's
adoption by France. At that time, France's adoption left China as the sole nuclear power
yet to embrace the treaty. See Meise, supra note 11, at 569.
119 See Kellman, supra note 1, at 785.
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international policy making and would merely serve to highlight
the very aspects of the existing international framework to which
China objects.
Accordingly, the United States should curtail Chinese
proliferation by encouraging China to take a leadership role in the
existing international framework. Imputing such leadership
capacity would place China in the position of enforcer and would
automatically institute an incentive for China's self-adherence to
NPT provisions. China would also assume a substantial role in
policing the NPT and related frameworks throughout Asia. Doing
this would create a further incentive for China to create its own
domestic and international nonproliferation laws'2 ° and would de-
emphasize the role of the United States or other non-Asian powers
in the creation of localized nonproliferation frameworks. Still, in
approaching such an affirmative policy, it would be useful to
evaluate first whether China is already moving to embrace a
regional leadership position, and if so, to what extent.
VI. Future Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Proliferation
As examined in Part III, the existing international legal order
for nuclear energy is comprised of both binding rules and
agreements, with many nations adhering to the NPT as a core
instrument.'2' The number of countries adhering to the NPT has
been growing progressively since the treaty's first adoption in
1968 and currently includes over 180 members.'22 As the NPT
adds to its list of party states, the international legal regime for
nuclear energy appears to be progressively changing from a
collection of nonbinding to binding regulations and standards.'23
As states begin to accept otherwise nonbinding standards for their
national legislation, they voluntarily absorb international norms
into their domestic legal frameworks.'
2 4
China appears to be following this pattern. On January 12,
1998, an Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation took effect
after President Clinton certified that China had finally met the
120 See Meise, supra note 11, at 576.
121 See Kellman, supra note 1, at 801.
122 See NPT List, supra note 42.
123 See ELBARADEI, supra note 20.
124 See id.
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requirements of nonproliferation under U.S. law."' This
certification, however, did not settle the issue of Chinese nuclear
proliferation, and the President's action drew heavy fire from
Congress. Senator John Ashcroft of Missouri argued that the
President's action prematurely committed the United States to a
course of cooperative action with China, basing his position on the
belief that recent nonproliferation efforts had been insufficient and
did not yet "justify a bill of good health.' 26  In explaining his
action, the President pointed to a number of recent developments
in Chinese nonproliferation policy, which he argued met the legal
threshold for determining cooperation.
2
1
The developments referred to by President Clinton included
the following: (1) China's commitment and continued adherence
to its pledge not to provide assistance to nuclear facilities
operating outside IAEA safeguards; 2 1 (2) China's joining the
Zangger Committee-a group of major nuclear supplier states that
undertakes to further international awareness of particularly
dangerous nuclear materials; 29 (3) China's pledge to end all civil
nuclear commerce with Iran; 130 (4) China's Council of State's
adoption of a system of comprehensive export control regulations
for nuclear materials and technologies;.'. and (5) China's growing
general involvement and support for the international control of
armaments and nonproliferation regimes.12  The President's
arguments were clearly intended to ease the apprehensions of an
initially skeptical Congress. Indeed, Congress would ultimately
125 See Diamond, supra note 2.
126 Senator John Ashcroft, China's Plan to Sell Nuclear Material to Iran Shows
Clinton Summit Decision Was Wrong (visited Oct. 15, 1999)
<http:l/www.senate.gov/-ashcroft/3- 13-98.htm>.
127 See Diamond, supra note 2.
128 See id.
129 The Zangger Committee is a group of 31 States that together produce a
"trigger list" of materials that fall under control of IAEA safeguards due to their utility in
the production of nuclear weapons. See id.; see also ELBARADEI, supra note 20 (noting
that the Zangger Committee instituted a uniform approach to the implementation of the
NPT through its listing of special fissionable materials, the source of these materials and
any ancillary materials needed to process or produce such special fissionable materials).




CHINA'S NUCLEAR EXPORTS TO IRAN
decline to block the President's action-which it could have done
by passing a simple resolution of disapproval. 33
Regardless of the President's purpose, his arguments describe
a pattern of policy changes undertaken by the Chinese
Government that in turn suggest a radical departure from China's
policies of only a decade before. Until very recently, China had
the distinction of being the only nuclear weapon state lacking an
explicit policy of nuclear weapons nonproliferation. 3 4 Along with
France, China's earlier absence from the Zangger Committee had
been considered a substantial weakness in the viability of both the
Committee and the IAEA system of safeguards.'35 In joining
Zangger and the NPT, China has clearly shown signs of a new
respect for international standards relating to nuclear weapons.
The importance of this apparent development cannot be
understated. Due to the prior absence of an explicit contrary
policy within the Chinese government, observers had believed that
Chinese sales of nuclear fuels and technology to Iran and other
countries would continue.36 Economic incentives coupled with
the demonstrated policies of China's government indicated that
Chinese proliferation efforts had the potential of turning Iran into a
nuclear power.'37 The fact that China could deliver Iran to the
nuclear threshold without violating the NPT had the potential to
degrade the NPT and associated frameworks, regardless of the
system's relative strengths.'38 Having achieved nuclear capability,
Iran could have simply withdrawn from the NPT and during the
three-month withdrawal period, undertaken the final steps toward
developing a fully functional nuclear weapons program. In spite
of the past successes of the international system, this scenario
could have devastating consequences for the NPT-based
frameworks. This hypothetical underscores the importance of
China's adherence to an international legal framework and
illustrates how China could easily become the "linchpin" of the
"I See id.
134 See Meise, supra note 11, at 558.
135 See Kellman, supra note 1, at 807.
136 See Meise, supra note 11, at 558.
137 See id. at 565.
138 See id.
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post-Cold War NPT-centered regime. 39
Given that past Chinese policy changes with respect to
nonproliferation have largely been the result of sporadic U.S.
pressure and that China's future policy will certainly reflect U.S.
actions, 4 ° prudence on the part of American policy makers is
absolutely essential for preventing future nuclear exports to Iran.
VII. Conclusion
In undertaking to curtail Chinese nuclear exports to Iran, the
United States faces a frustrating situation. As members of the
NPT, both China and Iran are precluded from engaging in the
trade of nuclear weapons and related materials under international
law.' 4' NPT membership, however, also permits and in fact
facilitates Chinese exports of nuclear materials and technology to
Iran for peaceful purposes. 42 While the inherent duality of nuclear
technology suggests substantial overlap between the peaceful and
nonpeaceful nuclear uses of nuclear energy, Iran's NPT
entitlements clearly allow for Chinese exports of materials and
know-how that could potentially be incorporated into an Iranian
nuclear weapons program.' 43 This predicament represents a clear
shortcoming of the existing international legal framework relating
to nuclear energy. It may also represent a shortcoming in
American foreign policy relating to Chinese nuclear proliferation.
Past successes of the current international regime and of
American foreign policy may hold the key to the effective
curtailing of Chinese nuclear exports to Iran. China's current shift
toward greater respect for the existing international legal regime
reflects successful measures undertaken by the U.S. government in
the past. 44  Likewise, the shortcomings of current Chinese
nonproliferation policy reflect inconsistencies in the application of
prior U.S. policies toward China. 45  U.S. restrictions on the
transfer of both nuclear and non-nuclear technology to China have
139 Id. at 543.
140 See id. at 570.
14 See Kellman, supra note 1, at 801.
142 See Meise, supra note 11, at 565.
143 See id.
144 See Diamond, supra note 2.
145 See Meise, supra note 11, at 570.
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proven effective in the past, while the pursuit of economic
sanctions has resulted in less desirable outcomes. 146 Moreover, the
most effective U.S. policies are those that respect China's nuclear
dealings and encourage greater Chinese participation and
leadership in the international legal regime relating to nuclear
energy. 47 The foundation of a binding and mutually agreeable
solution to the problem of China's proliferation activities has been
established. It remains to be seen, however, whether this solution
will prevent Iran from entering the growing club of nuclear
powers.
146 See generally Kellman, supra note 1, at 843 (detailing types and effects of
economic penalties employed).
147 See id.
20001 379

